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likely to respond to an increase in perceived audit probability. This information can be used to 
target audits toward taxpayers that respond particularly strongly, and to construct risk indicators 
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lessons learned during the implementation.
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Conducting successful and cost-effective 
audits is no easy task. Audits are costly for 
both tax administrators and taxpayers, and tax 
administrations often have limited information 
and resources to design and optimize their 
audit strategies. Audit performance is often 
reported to be a particularly weak element of tax 
administration (Ebrill et al., 2001). 
In this paper, we present a methodology for a 
critical component of an audit strategy: the 
selection of taxpayers to be audited.1 Risk-
based selection methods are increasingly used 
by tax administrators as a tool to allocate their 
audit activities. The goal of these methods is 
to identify those taxpayers who are most likely 
to respond strongly to an increase in the audit 
probability. Audits are then conducted based on 
that assessment, rather than randomly or on 
an ad-hoc basis. Various analytical prediction 
techniques such as data matching, data mining, 
and parametric and non-parametric models are 
used to identify high-risk cases.2 A score can 
then be assigned to each individual or business 
based on their identified characteristics. This is 
similar, for example, to risk indicators created 
in the financial industry for credit risks. For the 
construction of such risk indicators, we also 
present a way to overcome the methodological 
challenge of combining data obtained from 
randomized interventions with data-mining-
based prediction models. 
A key challenge when using these methods, 
however, is to accurately identify what information 
to use as input into the risk prediction models. 
For that purpose, we present a methodology to 
improve the allocation of audits using randomized 
deterrence messages. This approach avoids 
both the high costs of randomized audits, and 
the problems of selection bias inherent in using 
information based on non-randomized past audit 
histories as input for the prediction models. We 
illustrate our method based on a randomized 
impact evaluation conducted by Pomeranz 
(2013) in collaboration with the Chilean Tax 
Authority, Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII). 
This approach can be implemented in many 
different settings and for different types of taxes, 
at a very low cost compared to the gains in 
revenue. Furthermore, a similar strategy can 
also be used in other contexts, for example in the 
case of organizations that use audits or similar 
monitoring processes as part of their operations. 
Developing a risk-based model or a scoring 
technique faces two main challenges. First, the 
variable of interest is not easily observable. For 
some risk-based indicators in other contexts, 
such as credit scoring, the outcome of interest 
– credit default – is easily observable. Financial
institutions have direct access to the information
of credit default for all their clients, which, when
combined with clients’ characteristics, can be
used to develop a scoring model that predicts
creditworthiness. Tax non-compliance, on
the other hand, similar to corruption or crime
activities, is an act of concealing information.
Collecting data on this variable requires
measurement efforts which, as in the case of
audits, are often very costly.
1.  This project would not have been possible without the generous support of the following institutions: Chilean Tax Authority - Servicio de Impuestos 
Internos (SII), the Center for International Development at the Harvard Kennedy School, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 
the Project on Justice Welfare and Economics at Harvard University and the Swiss Study Foundation. All errors are our own, and we are available 
for any questions about the implementation of the study and the potential application of the method in other contexts.
2. For a detailed description of risk-based methodologies see Vellutini (2011).
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Second, when data exists, for example from prior 
audits, it is often difficult to gather conclusive 
insights because of selection bias. Audits are 
usually not randomly conducted. An analysis 
that compares data from audited taxpayers with 
that from non-audited taxpayers faces such 
selection problems, since taxpayers in the two 
groups are not necessarily comparable. Firms 
that have been selected for audits in the past 
are different from those that have not, which can 
result in erroneous interpretations about what 
type of taxpayer has the highest risk. A high-
quality prediction method therefore requires 
an identification strategy that can determine 
a causal relation between compliance and a 
set of taxpayer characteristics. However, most 
risk-based analysis on taxes lacks external 
variation in a variable that can potentially affect 
compliance. 
Our methodology addresses both of these 
challenges. We use a randomized control trial in 
which the perceived audit probability of randomly 
selected taxpayers is increased through a 
notice from the tax authority informing them that 
they are under special scrutiny. The response 
to the notice is measured by comparing the 
subsequent tax payments of those randomly 
assigned to receive the notice, to those in the 
control group, who did not receive the notice. 
Furthermore, analyzing the differences in the 
responses allows us to investigate what types 
of taxpayer characteristics are associated with 
a stronger response. These characteristics, in 
turn, can be fed into the risk indicator calculation, 
which helps identify the most optimal candidates 
for an audit. The goal of this study is to target 
resources where the expected increase in tax 
payments is the highest. 
Our proposed methodology also addresses a 
common concern related to the implementation 
costs of randomized audits. Randomized 
deterrence messages can capture similar 
information to what would have been obtained 
by conducting an actual audit, but at a fraction 
of the cost. Sending a deterrence letter from 
the tax authority measures the response of 
a taxpayer to the perceived probability of 
being audited. The letter thereby increases 
the expected cost of non-compliance, thus 
increasing the incentive to declare more taxes. 
As taxpayers may also vary in how they react 
to the threat of an audit, this strategy does not 
necessarily capture taxpayers who are evading 
the most, but rather those who respond the 
most to an increase in the probability of being 
audited. The results are thus aligned with 
strategy of increasing revenues. In addition, 
the low cost associated with sending the letters 
allows authorities to work with data for a large 
number of individuals, thereby increasing the 
precision of the analysis. 
The issue of selection bias is addressed by 
sending the letters in a randomly selected manner. 
We can thus obtain an unbiased estimation of 
taxpayer responses to an increase in the threat 
of being audited, and of how different taxpayer 
characteristics are associated with stronger 
responses. Once that information is collected, 
we construct a very simple risk indicator for 
each taxpayer that provides the probability of 
responding to the higher threat. In practice, more 
complex risk indicators can also be employed. 
The methodology consists of three steps: 
1. Deterrence notice: The first and most
involved step consists of a randomized
controlled trial in which the perceived audit
probability of randomly selected taxpayers
is increased through a notice from the tax
authority informing them that they are under
special scrutiny.
2. Estimating the reaction to the notice: The
response to the notice can be measured by
comparing the subsequent tax payments of
those randomly assigned to receive the notice
to those in the control group, who did not
receive any notice.
3. Extracting information for improved audit
targeting: Comparing the different responses 
allows tax administrators to investigate
what types of taxpayer characteristics are
associated with a stronger response to the
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increase in the perceived audit probability. 
This information can also be summarized 
in an overall risk indicator that estimates for 
each taxpayer, the likelihood of responding 
positively to an increased audit probability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: Section 1 describes the methodology 
and the steps involved in its implementation. 
Section 2 provides background information 
and basic results from the intervention in 
Chile. Section 3 outlines some of the lessons 
learned during this implementation. Section 4 
discusses the costs and benefits associated 
with the implementation of this methodology, 
and Section 5 concludes. 
1.   METHODOLOGY
This section describes the three steps involved 
in the process of setting up and analyzing 
randomized deterrence message to optimize tax 
enforcement. 
1.1.  Implementation of the deterrence notice
The first step toward estimating taxpayers’ 
responses to an increase in perceived audit 
probability requires a credible strategy to change 
their expectations. This can be achieved through 
an official message from the tax authority 
informing them that they have been selected for 
special scrutiny. The credibility of the deterrence 
message is of great importance, both to ensure the 
effectiveness of this strategy to gain information 
to optimize tax enforcement, and to avoid 
undermining the credibility of the tax authority in 
the process of this intervention (the latter will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 4). 
The implementation of randomized deterrence 
messages involves a number of key steps that 
lead to a valid analysis:3 
•	 Choice of the universe of taxpayers to 
be studied: The process should start by 
identifying the universe of taxpayers for which 
information about the response to audits will 
be analyzed. In the selection of the relevant 
universe, tax authorities should consider their 
capacity and limitations in order to tailor their 
audit efforts based on the information that 
will be obtained. For example, the analysis 
could be based on all individuals subject to 
the personal income tax, or all independent 
entrepreneurs, etc. However, it is important 
that the universe be large enough to allow for 
the detection of statistically significant effects 
(see below). 
•	 Choice of the content of the deterrence 
notice: Once the target universe has been 
selected, the content of the deterrence 
message can be developed. For practical 
reasons, two issues should be kept in mind 
when choosing the wording of the message. 
First, the message should credibly and 
effectively communicate an increase in the 
perceived probability of being audited. Second, 
the message should be straightforward and 
minimize possible confusion on the part of the 
recipient in order to avoid an influx of inquiries, 
concerns, or complaints to the tax authority’s 
helpline or offices. It is advisable to conduct 
a series of qualitative pre-tests and informal 
interviews with taxpayers in order to ensure 
that the message has the intended effect and 
that the wording is clear to a broad range of 
taxpayers with varying backgrounds. 
3. These steps usually also apply to the implementation of randomized evaluations in many other areas and contexts.
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•	 Choice of the number of taxpayers to 
receive the deterrence notice: To be able 
to detect a statistically significant impact 
of the deterrence message and gather 
information on differences between different 
types of taxpayers, the sample size in 
both the treatment and the control groups 
needs to be sufficiently large. The method 
used to determine the minimum number 
of observations required for statistical 
significance is called power calculations.4 
Power calculations should always be 
performed as a key initial step. In general, 
the higher the number of characteristics 
and subgroups for which one would like to 
estimate differential effects, the larger the 
required sample size. In other words, the 
more fine-tuned the analysis is intended 
to be, the larger the required number of 
taxpayers in the analysis. Note that the 
number of taxpayers in the treatment and 
control groups need not necessarily be the 
same. In fact, it is advisable that all taxpayers 
who were randomly selected not to receive 
the notice be included in the control group, 
even if the number of individuals in this group 
is many times larger than the number in the 
treatment group. 
•	 Random selection of those taxpayers 
slated to receive the deterrence notice: 
It is crucial for the validity of the analysis 
that taxpayers be selected in a random 
process from among the universe selected 
for the analysis. The randomization creates 
two groups of taxpayers that are identical 
in all observable and non-observable 
characteristics, except for the receipt of 
the deterrence notice. All differences in 
terms of subsequent tax payments between 
the treatment and the control group can 
therefore be attributed to the deterrence 
notice.5 For this to remain true, it is important 
that subsequent to the random assignment, 
taxpayers in both the treatment and control 
groups continue to be treated exactly the 
same in all aspects except for the deterrence 
notice. Also, the control group has to consist 
only of taxpayers that were randomly selected 
not to receive the message. Any taxpayers 
who were not part of the original universe 
for which the randomization was performed 
cannot be included in the analysis. 
•	 Pilot: Before the mass mailing or distribution 
of the deterrence notice, it is highly advisable 
to conduct a pilot of the intervention with a 
small sub-sample in order to verify whether 
all the required actions can be implemented 
as planned. Typically, important lessons 
are learned during the pilot phase and 
unexpected obstacles can be discovered and 
removed before the large scale distribution is 
implemented. Pilots can therefore contribute 
significantly to the successful implementation 
of the proposed methodology. 
•	 Ensuring that the random selection is 
respected in the implementation: For the 
validity and success of the analysis, it is 
important that the original random assignment 
be preserved and not tampered with. This 
means two things in practice: first, ensuring 
that as much as possible, those taxpayers 
that have been selected to receive the notice 
indeed receive one, and those, who have 
been selected to be in the control group, do not 
receive it (see discussion in Section 4 below 
on why that might not always be possible); 
second, where this is not fully possible, taking 
care to maintain the information about who 
was originally assigned to the treatment and 
control groups. In order to ensure the validity of 
the analysis, it is imperative that all estimation 
be conducted based on this original random 
assignment. 
4. Power calculation can be applied through programs such as “Optimal Design” http://www.wtgrantfdn.org/resources/research-tools. For more 
details on power calculation see also Duflo et al. (2007).
5. For more details on the rationale and benefits of using randomization see Duflo et al. (2007).
 CIAT/AEAT/IEF Tax Administration Review No. 366
1.2   Estimating the reaction to the notice
The second step of the methodology is to 
estimate the magnitude of taxpayers’ reactions 
to the higher expected probability of being 
audited. To obtain an unbiased estimate of this 
reaction, we rely on the randomized assignment 
of the notice, as discussed above. Due to this 
random assignment, the effect of the deterrence 
notice can be measured by simply comparing 
the tax payments in the period following the 
distribution of the notice, of those who were 
selected to receive the notice, with those in the 
control group.6 
The overall impact of the message can be 
estimated using regression analysis, following 
the specification shown in Equation (1). This 
specification is a difference-in-difference 
approach. A simple difference of the post-treatment 
outcomes would also be valid. The inclusion of the 
pre-treatment period and the taxpayer fixed effect 
simply improves the precision of the analysis. 
 yit=α+β1 tZi+β2 Zi+λi+δt+eit          (1)
In regression (1), yit represents the outcome 
variable of interest for taxpayer i at time t, and Zi is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
the taxpayer has been assigned to the treatment 
group. tZi indicates whether the taxpayer 
belongs to the treatment group, and the time is 
in the post-treatment period. δt stands for a year 
or month fixed effect, λi is a taxpayer fixed effect, 
and eit is an error term. This regression estimates 
the coefficient of interest, , which represents 
the overall treatment effect. It indicates the 
difference in the outcome of interest caused by 
the treatment. 
One choice of variables is the outcome of interest. 
A useful metric in this regard is the amount of 
tax declared. For estimation purposes, different 
specifications of this variable can be employed, 
including the following:
•	 The mean amount of taxes declared: 
This basic specification provides an easy 
interpretation of the estimated effects. It 
indicates the additional amount of taxes paid 
among those who received the deterrence 
notice. It is therefore also informative for cost-
benefit analyses of different audit strategies. 
At the same time, this specification has two 
potential drawbacks. First, it often leads to 
relatively low statistical power, and it therefore 
provides less precision to estimate differential 
responses by different types of taxpayers. The 
specific amounts can be driven by outliers, 
and may therefore sometimes be misleading. 
A second drawback relates to the interest 
to study not only which taxpayers respond 
most in terms of absolute financial amounts, 
but also in relative terms. For example, an 
increase in $100 for a small store is very 
different from an increase of the same amount 
by a large factory. However, the magnitudes 
of the estimations of the mean are driven by 
the relative size of taxpayers. This can make 
them less useful when interested in estimating 
differential behavior by type of taxpayer (e.g. 
comparing small vs. medium size firms). 
•	 The log of the amount of taxes declared: 
Since the log approximates changes of the 
outcome to changes in percentage terms, it 
can be useful to estimate relative changes 
and therefore gives a better indication of 
the behavior change of different taxpayers. 
However, logs cannot be applied if the 
outcome variable includes negative 
amounts, such as tax obligations below 
zero that can subsequently be employed 
as carry-over tax credits in the following tax 
declaration. This is for example the case in 
the Chilean VAT.
6. Note that the validity of the analysis is compromised if it compares those who received the message to taxpayers who were not included in the 
universe for which the randomization was conducted. Instead, the analysis must compare all those assigned to the treatment group to all those 
assigned to the control group. The original assignment needs to be used whatever be their actual treatment status (intent-to-treat, ITT). If the 
relevant information is the effect of the intervention itself rather than the original assignment, then the effect of the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) 
can be used. See Duflo et al. (2007) for more details on ITT and TOT.
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•	 The median of declared taxes: A quantile 
regression is a specification that can also 
be used when there is large dispersion in 
the data, since the median is less sensitive 
to extreme values than the mean. It has the 
benefit of still being applicable when there 
are negative values in the data. However, 
similar to the mean, the magnitude of the 
estimates is driven by the relative size of the 
taxpayers.
•	 The probability of declaring positive 
taxes: In many cases, a margin of interest 
can be whether taxpayers are declaring any 
taxes at all, either by submitting a declaration 
or not, or if a declaration is submitted, 
declaring a positive amount. The impact 
of the deterrence notice on this behavior 
can be measured by a linear probability 
regression. This is a regular OLS regression, 
where a dummy variable indicating whether 
the taxpayer declares positive taxes is the 
outcome variable. 
•	 The probability of declaring higher taxes 
compared to last year: Another specification 
that can be very useful is a linear probability 
regression, where the outcome variable is a 
dummy indicating whether declared taxes 
are higher than in the previous year. This 
specification is robust to outliers and large 
variances in the data, is not driven by the 
taxpayer’s size, and can deal with negative 
amounts of the tax variable.  
The choice of the outcome variable to be used for 
estimation purposes can be made on a case-by-
case basis, depending on the data available, the 
distribution of the data, and the type of analysis 
the tax authority is interested in. In Section 3, we 
discuss the variable chosen for our implementation 
in Chile and the reason behind that choice. 
How should the responses to the letter be 
interpreted? Can the magnitude of the taxpayers’ 
reactions be used as a good estimation of 
overall tax evasion? Not necessarily. While 
paying higher taxes in response to an increased 
audit probability suggests that taxpayers might 
have been underreporting tax liabilities before 
receiving the deterrence notice, the amount of 
increased payments may not be a good estimator 
of the amount of taxes evaded. Taxpayers may 
still engage in evasion after receiving the notice 
if, for example, they are confident that their 
evasion cannot be detected, if they expect the 
fine to be low or non-enforced, or if they doubt 
the credibility of the deterrence message. On 
the other hand, some taxpayers may respond 
to the audit notice by over-declaring taxes. 
Therefore, the response to the letter should not 
be interpreted as an accurate estimate of tax 
evasion but instead as the response to a higher 
expected probability of being audited. 
1.3  Extracting information for improved 
audit targeting
1.3.1  What types of taxpayers respond more?
The goal of this approach is not merely to 
estimate the magnitude of taxpayers’ overall 
reactions to the message, but also the kinds 
of taxpayer characteristics that are associated 
with a stronger reaction to the notice, such as 
firm size, industry, geographical location, or past 
behavior. 
Similar to an actual audit, the response of 
taxpayers to a deterrence notice will vary. The 
variables that can influence the magnitude 
of taxpayers’ response to the threat of audits 
include: (i) the amount of tax currently being 
evaded, (ii) the expected audit probability prior 
to receiving the notice of increased scrutiny, (iii) 
the expected penalty and the extent to which it 
is anticipated to be actually enforced, (iv) the 
expected likelihood that an audit will reveal 
evasion, and (v) the taxpayer’s degree of risk 
aversion, to name a few. 
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For the estimation of the differential response 
by type of taxpayer, we use a variation of 
regression (1), which is captured by the following 
specification: 
yit=α+β1 tZi+β2 tXi+β3 tZi Xi+δt+λi+eit,      (2)
where Xi is a vector of taxpayer characteristics, and tZiXi is an interaction term of taxpayer characteristics Xi and the post-treatment indicator described 
above. From this regression, we can estimate the 
coefficient of interest, , which represents the 
interactions of the treatment effect with taxpayer-
specific characteristics.7  For example, if the 
taxpayers that are analyzed are firms, we can 
classify them by level of sales according to five 
categories: no sales, micro size, small, medium or 
large. Then, Xm, Xs, XM XL represent dummy variables 
indicating the respective firm sizes (“no sales” is 
the omitted category). In this case, the estimated 
coefficient  for the tZi Xm variable would show 
the differential impact of the deterrence letter for 
micro size firms compared to the effect on firms 
that had no sales. A positive estimated coefficient 
means that, all else equal, micro size firms react 
comparatively more than those with no sales. If the 
goal of a tax authority is to increase tax revenues, 
then audits should target micro firms more heavily 
than firms with no sales. This is precisely what will 
be captured by our proposed risk indicator. 
1.3.2   Constructing a risk indicator 
Rather than analyzing the differential effects 
for specific taxpayer characteristics in isolation, 
one can also aggregate the information on 
how taxpayer characteristics interact with the 
treatment into one single risk indicator. One 
very simple way in which this can be done is 
by using the estimated coefficients for β1 and 
the differential effects by taxpayers’ types β3 
from regression (2). Together, these predict the 
response to the deterrence notice by all taxpayers 
based on their characteristics. This information is 
often available and continually collected by most 
tax authorities, allowing a regular calculation of 
the risk indicator for all taxpayers. 
The risk indicator is therefore calculated as 
follows:
          (3)
where ri provides a numerical value for each 
taxpayer, indicating the expected response to an 
increase in the audit probability. This risk indicator 
can be directly applied to the design of an audit 
strategy. A tax authority could, for example, rank 
taxpayers in term of  and then audit those with 
the highest values of the indicator. 
It is worth noting that in the case that the 
independent variable is defined as the probability 
of paying positive taxes or higher taxes than the 
previous year, ri is independent of the relative 
size of taxes paid, and higher values of ri do 
not necessarily represent higher additional 
revenues. If a tax authority wants to target 
taxpayers with a higher probability of responding 
to the deterrence notice as a way to target those 
taxpayers most suspicious of tax evasion, then ri is the appropriate indicator to use. If instead 
the tax authority is interested in maximizing 
tax revenues, it might want to multiply ri by a 
variable that captures taxpayers’ size, such as 
past revenues or taxable income, and use this 
new value as the risk indicator. 
7. If the specification employed is not a panel regression and therefore does not include taxpayer fixed effects, Xi needs to be included on its own in the 
regression as well, in place of λi.
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This methodology has been implemented in 
close collaboration with the Chilean Tax Authority, 
Servicio de Impuestos Internos de Chile (SII). 
SII has the reputation of being highly effective 
and is one of the most respected institutions 
in the country (Adimark, 2006). This reputation 
has been obtained over time through various 
factors, such as the provision of high-quality 
public service, constant service improvement, 
and application of cutting-edge methods and 
technologies. Following this tradition, SII 
decided to implement the method of randomized 
deterrence notices as part of a continuous 
effort to improve its processes and identify new 
mechanisms in order to make tax collection and 
administration more effective. 
In the following, we discuss how each of the 
implementation steps laid out in Section 2 was 
put into practice in Chile. 
2.1  Implementation of the deterrence notice
•	 Choice of the universe of taxpayers to be 
studied: The analysis in Chile focuses on 
the Value Added Tax (VAT), which represents 
approximately half of tax revenues of the 
country (Servicio de Impuestos Internos, 
2012). Although the VAT is believed to 
have distinctive features that make it less 
vulnerable to evasion and fraud, in recent 
years there has been an increasing concern 
regarding VAT revenue losses associated 
with non-compliance in both developed and 
developing countries (Keen and Lockwood, 
2010). The universe of taxpayers included 
in the Chilean analysis consisted of all small 
and medium size firms in the country that 
were operating in June 2008, had declared 
a positive amount of VAT for at least one 
month between July 2007 and June 2008, 
and had valid postal addresses. Larger 
taxpayers were not included in the analysis 
because they face a different audit process, 
administered by a separate unit within SII. 
•	 Choice of the content of the deterrence 
notice: With the aim of increasing taxpayers’ 
perceived audit probabilities, SII sent 
deterrence letters to a randomly selected 
group of small and medium size firms.8 In 
particular, the letters informed taxpayers 
that in a random selection process among 
micro, small and medium size firms, they 
had been selected for analysis, and in 
case of any detected irregularities, they 
could be summoned to an audit. In order to 
ensure that the message had the intended 
impact, a series of informal interviews were 
conducted with firm representatives prior to 
the mailing. During these interviews, owners 
or accountants of small and medium size 
firms were asked how they would interpret 
the message and what they would do if they 
received one. These pre-tests helped fine-
tune the message. They also alerted the tax 
authority as to the usefulness of mentioning 
in the letter that taxpayers did not need to 
take any immediate action or come to the 
tax authority office to inquire for further 
information. The content of the messages 
was also vetted by the internal legal and 
communications departments of SII. 
•	 Choice of the number of taxpayers to 
receive the deterrence notice: Power 
calculations showed that among the selected 
sample of 445,734 taxpayers in Chile, mailing 
of the deterrence message to 102,000 was 
required to have a high enough probability 
2.   IMPLEMENTATION: THE CASE OF CHILE
8. To test whether the impact of the letter was due to the deterrence message or due to the simple fact of receiving mail from the tax authority, 
motivational and placebo letters that contained information irrelevant for tax compliance, were also sent to randomly selected taxpayers. For more 
details see (Pomeranz, 2013).
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to obtain statistically significant results. As 
described in Section 2, treatment and control 
groups do not necessarily have to have the 
same number of units. Since the control 
group in this case has no cost, and since 
the notice might lose credibility if too large a 
share of firms receives it, it can often result 
that the treatment group is smaller than the 
control group in this type of intervention.
•	 Random selection of the taxpayers 
slated to receive the deterrence notice: 
The random selection of taxpayers was 
conducted electronically in order to avoid any 
possible human interference and therefore 
ensure the validity of the process. To 
increase the precision of the randomization 
process at making treatment and control 
groups comparable in all characteristics, 
the sample was stratified by a few key firm 
characteristics, such as size, region, past 
audits, etc. Randomization then took place 
within these subgroups. 
•	 Pilot: A pilot of 250 letters was sent out 
two months prior to the large-scale mailing, 
helping detect wrinkles in the process. It 
allowed adjusting several internal procedures, 
as well as the wording of the letters, and 
ensured a smooth implementation of the 
large-scale mailing. 
•	 Ensuring that the random selection is 
respected in the implementation:  The 
letter messages were mailed in envelopes by 
the VAT department of the tax administration. 
The notice was sent using certified mail, so 
that information could be obtained on which 
taxpayers actually received the letter and by 
what date. In order to minimize the cases 
where taxpayers in the treatment group 
received no letter, taxpayers with invalid 
postal addresses were excluded from the 
universe. It was very important to exclude 
those with invalid mailing addresses both 
from the treatment and the control group. 
If they had been excluded only from the 
treatment group, this would have rendered 
the comparison between the remaining 
treatment group and the control group 
invalid. The exclusion of those with invalid 
addresses allowed for a substantial increase 
in the statistical power of the experiment by 
significantly reducing non-compliance with 
treatment assignment.9 
2.2     Estimating the reaction to the notice
2.2.1   Summary statistics at baseline
The first step of the analysis in any randomized 
control trial is to verify that the randomization has 
been done properly, and that the treatment and 
control groups are not statistically significantly 
different from each other prior to the intervention. 
Table 1 presents such baseline summary 
statistics for the taxpayers in the treatment group 
and the difference with respect to the control 
group. As one would expect given the random 
assignment, average characteristics between 
the two groups look very similar, and none of the 
differences are statistically significant. 
9. Partial compliance (i.e. if not all those assigned to treatment actually receive treatment, or if some assigned to the control group still receive the 
treatment) strongly reduces the statistical power of randomized evaluations. The higher the non-compliance rate, the higher the sample size that 
is required to estimate a minimum effect. To estimate the direct effect on the compliers, a treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimation needs to be 
applied in these cases.
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Table 1 
Baseline Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization
Control 
 Group
Difference of the  
Treatment Group  
Monthly tax paid (mean) 264,434 1,342  
(2,746) (10,144)  
Monthly tax paid (median) 69,892 -779  
(458) (920)  
Taxpayer age in months 108 -0.32  
(0.12) (0.25)  
Non-filed declarations 4.3 -0.03  
(0.02) (0.05)  
No sales year prior 1.5 -0.05  
(0.02 (0.04)  
Micro size 74.5 -0.04  
(0.08) (0.16)  
Small size 18.2 0.03  
(0.07) (0.14)  
Retail taxpayers  2.8 0.01  
(0.03) (0.06)  
Intermediary taxpayers 28.7 -0.06 
(0.08) (0.16)  
Intermediary taxpayers 38.2 0.15  
(0.09) (0.18)  
Final sales 45.6 -0.10  
(0.08) (0.17)  
Number of taxpayers 306,605 102,031  
Notas:  Cada fila muestra el resultado obtenido por  regresión de la variable de interés en cuestión con un término 
constante y una variable dummy que indica el grupo al que pertenece. El término constante captura el valor que 
correspondiente al grupo de control. Los errores estándar robustos (entre paréntesis) se agrupan en el nivel de los 
contribuyentes. Los importes monetarios son en pesos chilenos (500 pesos son aproximadamente equivalentes a 
1 USD). Ninguna de las diferencias es estadísticamente significativa en un nivel de significancia del 10%. Todos los 
datos (incluyendo las características de los contribuyentes) se obtuvieron de los registros oficiales de impuestos.   
The first two rows of Table 1 show whether taxpayers are balanced in terms of their tax payments 
prior to sending the notice. The group of firms that took part in our analysis paid an average 
of 264,000 pesos (about 500 USD) in monthly VAT, with a median of approximately 70,000 
(about 140 USD). The large difference between the mean and the median indicates a very large 
dispersion in the distribution of tax payments. As discussed below, this large dispersion has 
implications for the regression specification used for the empirical analysis.
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Next, we look at potential differences in terms of 
size. There are five official firm size categories 
in Chile, based on the amount of sales in the 
previous tax year: firms with no sales, micro-
sized, small-sized, medium-sized and large-
sized firms.10 The micro-sized taxpayers are 
by far the largest group, comprising 74.5% of 
the universe. The second largest group is the 
small-sized taxpayers (18.2%), followed by the 
medium-sized taxpayers (2.8%) and taxpayers 
with no sales in the preceding year (1.5%). The 
remaining 3% are those new taxpayers that have 
not yet been classified. Taxpayers in treatment 
and control groups are balanced in terms of the 
proportion of firms of each size. 
Taxpayers are also balanced across treatment 
groups with respect to their position in the 
production chain: 28.8% are retailers that 
sell only to final consumers, and 38.2% are 
intermediary taxpayers that sell only to other 
taxpayers. Overall, the share of sales to the final 
consumer is 45.6%. Finally, the treatment and 
the control groups are similar in terms of age. On 
average, firms started operating approximately 
9 years before the baseline data was collected.
 
2.2.2   Overall impact of the deterrence letter
Once treatment-control balance has been 
verified, we estimate the effect of the deterrence 
letter using regression (1). Given the large 
dispersion in the distribution of declared taxes, 
analyzing the impact of the intervention on 
the mean of declared VAT does not lead to 
statistically significant results, as the variance 
is extremely large. Thus, we estimate a linear 
probability version of regression (1), where the 
outcome variable is the probability of paying 
higher VAT after receiving the notice, compared 
to the same month of the previous year. This 
specification has several benefits compared to 
alternative measures. First, as opposed to a log 
specification, it can be applied to variables that 
include zero or negative values, which is the 
case for declared taxes.11 Second, it is robust 
to outliers and high variances, as is the case 
with our fat-tailed distribution of declared taxes. 
Third, it takes into account firms in all parts of 
the distribution of VAT payments (as opposed 
to measures such as the probability of declaring 
positive taxes, the mean, or the median, which 
are all sensitive to taxpayers’ size), making it 
useful to compare the treatment effect between 
different types of firms.12 
The results show a significant impact of the 
deterrence message. The estimated overall 
treatment effect is a 1.40 percentage point 
increase in the probability of paying higher VAT 
than the same month of the previous year. The 
result is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(Pomeranz, 2013). Two other interesting results 
from the evaluation, also shown in Pomeranz 
(2013), are worth noting. First, the impact in terms 
of higher taxes seems to be very persistent. The 
initial impact in the treatment group is immediate 
and decreases only slowly over the following 
months. It reaches the same level as the control 
group again after about 18 months. In the first six 
months of the implementation of the enforcement 
letter, the increase in tax revenue is estimated 
to be about 3.3 million USD. Second, increasing 
the audit probability of firms generated spillovers 
up the VAT paper trail that lead to an increase 
of their suppliers’ tax payments. This result 
suggests that when designing audit strategies, 
tax authorities should not only consider the effect 
on the audited firm, but also the spillover effects 
on the firm´s trading network.
10. Large firms are not included in this study.
11. In Chile, firms can declare negative VAT amounts. In this case, they pay zero VAT for the corresponding month, and carry the negative tax amount 
over to their next declaration in form of a tax credit.
12. See Pomeranz (2013) for a detailed discussion on the use of alternative dependent variables, and why this particular outcome variable was chosen 
in the Chilean case.
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2.3  Extracting information for improved audit targeting
2.3.1  What types of taxpayers respond more?
Now that we have analyzed the overall impact 
of the deterrence notice, we can start looking 
at differential impacts by different types of 
taxpayers. We start by dividing the taxpayers 
according to three regional groups - North, South, 
and Metropolitan Region - and estimate the 
effect of the notice for each subgroup. Figure 1 
shows that the estimated effect of the deterrence 
letter is higher in the Metropolitan Region and in 
the South and lower in the North. 
Graph 1 
 Impact of the Notice by Region
Notes:  Each bar represents a separate regression for each region. The numbers on top of the bars indicate the coefficient 
on being in the treatment group. The height of the bar represents the effect of receiving the notice as a percentage 
point increase in the probability of paying higher taxes than last year. *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant 
at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
The differences in response by region may partly 
be due to the fact that firm characteristics vary 
by region along dimensions that may potentially 
influence the degree of response to the 
deterrence notice, such as firm size, economic 
sector, or the share of sales that goes to final 
consumers. The following figures present the 
differential effects along these dimensions. 
Figure 2 shows the impact of the notice by 
firm size. The response is highest among firms 
of smaller size, which is consistent with the 
claim that smaller taxpayers evade more taxes 
(Kleven et al., 2009). Internal processes that 
keep track of transactions, external monitoring 
mechanisms, and reputational effects are more 
likely to be present among larger taxpayers, 
making them less likely to respond to an 
additional increase in the audit probability 
(Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2006). According to 
these results, micro-size firms that received 
the letter had a 1.8 percentage point higher 
chance of increasing their VAT payments 
since the previous year. The effect is 1.3 
percentage points among small taxpayers and 
there is almost no effect among medium size 
taxpayers. 
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Graph 2
Impact of the Notice by Firm Size
Notes:  Each bar represents a separate regression for each size category. The numbers on top of the bars indicate the 
coefficient on being in the treatment group. The height of the bar represents the effect of receiving the notice as a 
percentage point increase in the probability of paying higher taxes than last year. *** = significant at the 1% level, ** 
= significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
Figure 3 shows a similar analysis based 
on different economic sectors following the 
classification of the Chilean Tax Authority. Sector 
1 represents agricultural fishing and mining 
activities, Sector 2 industry and manufacturing, 
Sector 3 construction, Sector 4 retail activities, 
Sector 5 hotels and restaurants, Sector 6 
regulated services (transportation, electricity, 
sanitation, etc.), Sector 7 finance and business-
related services, and Sector 8 all the remaining 
activities, including personal and social services. 
The largest estimated impacts are among sectors 
4 and 8 with a 2.3% probability of paying higher 
taxes when receiving the notice. No statistically 
significant impact was found for Sectors 1, 3, 5 
and 6. 
Graph 3
 Impact by Economic Sector
Notes:  Each bar represents a separate regression for each economic sector. The numbers on top of the bars indicate the 
coefficient on being in the treatment group. The height of the bar represents the effect of receiving the notice as a 
percentage point increase in the probability of paying higher taxes than last year. *** = significant at the 1% level, 
** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
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The results are consistent with the idea that 
sectors with higher proportions of sales to 
final consumers (such as the retail sector), 
face higher incentives to underreport VAT, 
and therefore might react more strongly than 
sectors that have more transactions with other 
firms (such as agriculture, fishing and mining) 
or sectors that are highly regulated and thus 
face higher levels of scrutiny (such as sector 6). 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the estimated reaction 
to the notice by firms with different shares 
of sales to final consumers as a fraction of 
total sales. We have grouped firms into 4 
categories: 1) upstream: those that only sell 
to other firms; 2) firms that have some final 
sales but overall sell less than 50% of total 
sales to final consumers; 3) firms whose share 
of final sales are above 50% but below 100%; 
and 4) retailers: firms that sell only to final 
consumers. As Figure 4 shows, the estimated 
effect is stronger the larger the share of sales 
to final consumers. The difference in impact 
between retail firms and upstream firms is 
indeed substantial. While the response among 
retailers is a 2.45% increase in the probability 
of paying more taxes, the response is only 
0.47% among upstream firms. 
Graph 4
Impact by Share of Final Sales
Notes: Each bar represents a separate regression for each category of shares of sales to final consumers. The numbers 
on top of the bars indicate the coefficient on being in the treatment group. The height of the bar represents the 
effect of receiving the notice as a percentage point increase in the probability of paying higher taxes than last 
year. *** = significant at the 1% level, **=  significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
Similar to Pomeranz (2013), these results show 
that the effect of the notice is stronger on firms 
that have a larger proportion of sales to the 
final consumer. This is also in line with the self-
enforcement hypothesis of the Value Added Tax. 
In the final stage of the production chain, the self-
enforcing mechanism, which operates through 
the paper trail built into the VAT structure, breaks 
down: while it is in the firms’ interest to ask 
suppliers for receipts in order to be able to deduct 
input costs from their VAT bill, final consumers 
have no incentive to do so (Keen, 2007). 
2.3.2   Constructing a risk indicator
The analysis by subgroup shown above allows 
evaluating the extent of response for different 
groups of taxpayers. However, each taxpayer 
of course has many characteristics, and they 
are often correlated with one another. For 
example, retail firms also tend to be smaller 
firms. Tax authorities may therefore want to 
construct risk indictors that take into account 
many different characteristics of taxpayers, 
and predict for each taxpayer the likelihood of 
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responding to increased deterrence based on 
its characteristics. We present a very simple 
way to construct such a risk indicator based 
on regression analysis. We then briefly discuss 
how the results from the randomized deterrence 
messages can be used in combination with 
more sophisticated methods of data mining and 
prediction models. 
To construct our simple risk indicator, we first 
calculate regression (2) for the entire sample 
with a set of taxpayer characteristics Xi. We 
then use the estimated coefficients 1 and 3 
to calculate equation (3). 3 is a vector with a 
coefficient for each taxpayer characteristic, and 
will therefore be different for different firms. For 
an illustrative example, see the calculations in 
the appendix.
In our simple model, the value of the risk indicator 
ranges from -4.42% to 3.26%. The mean of the 
indicator is 1.04% and the standard deviation 
1.02%. To get a sense of the differences in the 
magnitudes of the reaction to the notice among 
taxpayers, we can compare the value of the risk 
indicator at different parts of the distribution. The 
mean for the 99% percentile is 2.6 times larger 
than the mean for the entire sample, suggesting 
there are potentially large gains from targeting 
audits towards those firms that are more likely to 
increase tax payments when faced with a higher 
probability of being audited. 
Many tax administrations are moving towards 
the use of more sophisticated prediction models, 
based on modern data mining techniques. The 
input from the randomized deterrence messages 
can be used as input into these models as well. 
To be able to combine the results from the 
randomized intervention with the data-mining 
environment, an important additional step needs 
to be conducted. 
The challenge lies in the fact that the prediction 
models require some risk measure to be associated 
directly with each observation. For example, tax 
administrations sometimes use information of 
whether a taxpayer has been detected for evasion 
in the past as one such measure. (As discussed 
above, these measures can frequently suffer from 
selection bias, because it is not random, which 
taxpayers were monitored to detect evasion in 
the past.) However, in the case the data obtained 
from of the randomized experiment, there is no 
direct risk measure associated with each taxpayer. 
Instead, the information about how risky a taxpayer 
is only becomes apparent in comparison with the 
control group.
The following step allows bridging this gap: 
the prediction technology is applied twice, in 
a two-step process. First, tax payments for 
each firm are predicted, based on observable 
characteristics in the control group. Then, 
the difference is calculated for those in the 
treatment group, between the predicted value 
and the actual value. The predicted value is the 
value that would have been expected for the 
treated taxpayers, based on their observable 
characteristics, in the absence of treatment. The 
difference between actual and predicted can 
therefore be taken as a measure of the response 
to the deterrence message. This difference can 
now be used as input into the regular risk-based 
auditing models that the tax authority uses. For 
example, instead of (or in addition to) using a 
measure indicating whether a taxpayer has been 
detected for evasion in the past, the difference 
between actual and predicted can be used as a 
risk measure to build the risk indicator.
Dina Pomeranz, Cristóbal Marshall and Pamela Castellón
January  2014 17
In the course of implementing this methodology 
in Chile, a number of key lessons were learned. 
These lessons might also be useful for other tax 
authorities that are considering implementing a 
similar strategy, or for other organizations that 
conduct audits and can therefore follow the 
proposed methodology. The authors are also 
available to answer questions and provide support 
for practical implementation of this approach. 
•	 Selecting the right message: The wording 
used in the deterrence letters not only 
needs to transmit effectively the increase in 
the probability of being audited, but should 
also avoid confusion among taxpayers and 
minimize the cases when taxpayers come 
to tax offices or call to request additional 
information. This allows minimizing both the 
cost of this intervention for the tax authority 
and the compliance costs for the taxpayers. 
Pretesting different types of wording and 
piloting the intervention can therefore be 
very useful to address these kinds of issues. 
•	 Ensuring the right taxpayers receive 
the letter: To deal with this issue, the 
implementation of the methodology in Chile 
only included taxpayers with valid postal 
addresses. In addition, all the letters were sent 
via certified mail, which allowed for tracking 
those taxpayers who actually received the 
letter. 
•	 Trade-off between simplicity and 
prediction: When estimating a reaction to the 
notice with regression analysis, it is important 
to determine what variables representing 
taxpayers’ characteristics will be included in 
the regression analysis, and ultimately in the 
risk indicator. Since it is not clear ex-ante what 
kind of characteristics might have an effect 
on the outcome variable, one approach is to 
include in the regression as many potential 
explanatory variables as possible, and then 
rely on the statistical selection criteria to 
determine the right model.13 An alternative 
approach is to rely on a more simplified model 
that would include variables that are easy to 
interpret and analyze. In other words, there is 
a trade-off between increasing the predictive 
power of the model and relying on a more 
stable model in terms of time-consistency 
and resistance to noise in the data. More 
sophisticated data mining methods, as 
described above, are specifically designed to 
deal with such challenges, and to generate 
predictions based on large datasets. 
•	 Replications: Some of the aforementioned 
lessons suggest that this methodology is 
better suited for certain contexts. For example, 
implementation would be more challenging 
in an environment where the tax authority 
lacks credibility, or where corruption limits the 
scope of audits to generate a real threat to 
taxpayers. On the other hand, implementation 
is easier where the tax authority has a strong 
reputation and better mechanisms are in 
place to credibly enforce audits. 
•	 Sample size vs. long-term credibility: 
Being able to find statistically significant 
results requires a large number of treated 
firms. However, if taxpayers learn that a large 
number of notices were sent or that notices 
are sent repeatedly, they might assume that 
the tax authority has no intention or capacity 
to proceed with the auditing, or that the 
audits will not be very thorough. This could 
eventually attenuate or even eliminate any 
possible reaction from taxpayers (Ebrill et 
al 2001). In order to avoid such unintended 
3.   IMPLEMENTATION LESSONS LEARNED
13. For a discussion on application of statistical selection criteria see Sala-I-Martin et al. (2004).
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consequences, a tax authority that wishes to 
apply this methodology systematically and 
repeatedly should consider having the mailing 
followed by a number of actual detailed 
audits among taxpayers in the treatment 
group in order to produce a salient and 
credible increase in the likelihood of audit for 
these taxpayers. The tax authority might also 
consider sending a smaller number of letters 
regularly, rather than a very large number 
at the same time. The information acquired 
from these notices can then be aggregated 
over time in order to achieve the sufficient 
sample size that provides the statistical 
power required for the risk indicator. 
A combination of the mass-mailing strategy 
with a more long-term strategy can be to do 
a one-time mailing with a very large sample 
size in the first year, which gives baseline 
information for the risk indicator, and will work 
due to the one-time surprise. After that, the tax 
authority can use smaller mailings with a higher 
real increase in the audit probability to maintain 
credibility and at the same time assess possible 
changes in the responses over time. 
A simple back of the envelope calculation can 
show that constructing a risk indicator and using 
it for the purpose of optimizing auditing can be 
highly cost-effective. There are two types of 
benefits to the construction of a risk indicator: (i) 
a direct benefit of the increased revenue from 
the response to the notice, and (ii) subsequent 
benefits from using an optimized audit strategy 
based on the information provided by the risk 
indicator. 
Similarly, there are also two types of costs: (i) a 
direct cost of distributing the deterrence notices 
and possible additional costs of enforcement 
measures associated with the deterrence notice, 
and (ii) a potential loss of credibility if messages 
that are not supported by real increases of the 
audit probability are sent out by the tax authority 
repeatedly (see discussion above on how to 
minimize this risk). 
In terms of the direct returns associated with 
producing the indicator, we can compare the 
benefits of increasing tax revenues among the 
taxpayers that randomly received the deterrence 
notice to the actual cost of sending out the 
notice. When comparing total payments between 
treatment and control groups we found that the 
additional revenues for the first 6 months after 
mailing the letters were in the order of 10 million 
USD, and after 18 months in the order of 16 
million USD. On the other hand, the total costs 
of implementation, including the cost of sending 
out the letters, were in the order of 100,000 USD 
plus the costs related to implementing additional 
audits and administration. This is orders of 
magnitudes below the benefits obtained by the 
increase in tax revenues. 
The subsequent benefits associated with 
the improved audit strategy are the result of 
targeting more heavily those firms with a higher 
estimated probability of paying higher taxes 
in response. As shown in the case of Chile, 
the large dispersion in the distribution of the 
risk indicator and how those differences are 
driven by specific firm characteristics provides 
scope to improve the targeting of auditing and 
reap benefits in terms of higher tax revenues. 
In addition, the tax authority was able to use 
the information obtained in the study for other 
purposes, such as gaining information about 
the duration of deterrence effects, improving 
the mailing system, and making budgetary 
calculations. Finally, many lessons learned and 
skills built during the implementation process 
have been employed fruitfully in subsequent 
internal studies and analyses. 
4.    COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
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This paper presents a new methodology to 
generate information that can be used to 
optimize the audit strategy of tax administrators. 
Based on a randomized evaluation design, 
this method allows estimating what types of 
taxpayers are more likely to react to an increase 
in the perceived probability of being audited. 
That information can then be used to construct 
a risk indicator. Tax authorities can use this risk 
indicator to optimize their audit strategies, which 
is often regarded as one of the main priorities for 
tax administration (Ebrill et al., 2001; Bird and 
Gendron, 2007). 
This approach has two main advantages. First, it 
creates valuable information for tax administrators 
that is otherwise costly to obtain and usually only 
available for a small and non-representative 
set of taxpayers. This is especially relevant 
as the amount of information the tax authority 
has about different types of transactions in the 
economy has been found to be a key element 
that explains the difference in the performance of 
tax systems between developed and developing 
countries (Gordon and Li, 2009). Second, unlike 
most risk indicators that make predictions based 
on past information and thereby are likely to suffer 
from self-selection and omitted-variable bias, our 
randomized design creates a reliable estimator of 
taxpayers’ true responses to the audit threat.
The lessons from the application of our proposed 
methodology among VAT taxpayers in Chile 
show the importance of carefully designing and 
implementing the proposed analysis. Working 
with the appropriate sample size, ensuring the 
internal validity of the experiment, using the 
right wording to effectively change taxpayers’ 
perceived probability of being audited, and truth-
telling to maintain the credibility and deterrence 
power of the tax authority are all key elements 
to the success of the intervention. A similar 
approach can be used by tax authorities in 
many different contexts and for different taxes. 
Furthermore, it can easily be tailored to other 
types of organizations, whose operations require 
the implementation of audits or other monitoring 
processes. 
5.   CONCLUSIONS
Adimark (2006). Imagen del Servicio de 
Impuestos Internos. Retrieved from http://
www.sii.cl/aprenda_sobre_impuestos/estudios/
imagen.htm
Bird, R. & Gendrom, P. P. (2007). The VAT in 
Developing and Transitional Countries. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Duflo, E., Glennerster, R. & Kremer, M. 
(2007). Using Randomization in Development 
Economics Research: A Toolkit. Handbook of 
Development Economics, 4, 3895-3962.
Ebrill, L., Keen, M., Bodin, J. P. & Summers, V. 
(2001). The Modern VAT. International Monetary 
Fund, 1 (1), 1-23.
Keen, M. (2007). VAT Attacks!, International Tax 
and Public Finance, 14 (4), 365-381.
Keen, M. & Lockwood, B. (2010). The Value Added 
Tax: Its Causes and Consequences. Journal of 
Development Economics, 92 (2), 138-151.
6.    BIBLIOGRAPHY
 CIAT/AEAT/IEF Tax Administration Review No. 3620
Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T. & Saez, E. (2009). 
Why Can Modern Governments Tax so Much? An 
Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries. 
NBER Working Paper, 15218.
Kopczuk, W. & Slemrod, J. (2006). Putting Firms 
into Optimal Tax Theory. American Economic 
Review: Papers and Proceedings, 96 (2), 130-134.
Pomeranz, D. (2013). No Taxation without 
Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement 
in the Value Added Tax. NBER Working Paper 
19199.
Sala-I-Martin, X., Doppelhofer, G. & Miller, R. 
I. (2004). Determinants of Long-Term Growth: 
A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates 
(BACE) Approach. The American Economic 
Review, 96 (4), 813-835.
Servicio de Impuestos Internos (2012). Ingresos 
Tributarios Anuales 1993 a 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.sii.cl/estadisticas/
Vellutini, Ch. (2011). Risk-Based Audits: 
Approaches and Country Experience. The World 
Bank, Working Paper.
Dina Pomeranz, Cristóbal Marshall and Pamela Castellón
January  2014 21
Table A1
Results for our Illustrative Example of Regression (2)
Coefficient    Robust 
Standard Errors
Treatment*Post 0.0052 0.0049
Metropolitan*Treatment*Post 0.0012 0.0022
Micro*Treatment*Post 0.0160*** 0.0029
Small*Treatment*Post 0.0134*** 0.0037
Medium*Treatment*Post 0.0025 0.0073
Sector1*Treatment*Post -0.0226*** 0.0053
Sector2*Treatment*Post -0.0096* 0.0052
Sector3*Treatment*Post -0.0105* 0.0057
Sector4*Treatment*Post -0.0073* 0.0044
Sector5*Treatment*Post -0.0194*** 0.0063
Sector6*Treatment*Post -0.0132** 0.0056
Sector7*Treatment*Post -0.0095* 0.0053
Final Sales Share*Treatment*Post 0.0102*** 0.0028
Exporter*Treatment*Post -0.0195** 0.0082
Month Fixed Effects Yes
Number of Observations 7,308,631
Number of Taxpayers 406,834
R-squared 0.0004
Notes:  The table shows the results of linear probability regressions of an increase in declared VAT 
since the previous year. The first column shows the estimated coefficient and the second 
column the robust standard errors. *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 
5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
Given the results shown in Table A1, the formula for the risk indicator is the following: 
Risk Indicator = 0.0052 + 0.0012*Metropolitan + 0.0160*Micro + 0.0134*Small + 0.0025*Medium - 
0.0226*Sector1 - 0.0096*Sector2 - 0.0105*Sector3 - 0.0073*Sector4 - 0.0194*Sector5 - 0.0132*Sector6 
- 0.0095*Sector7 + 0.0102*Final Sales Share - 0.0195*Exporter
Variables Description 
The variables used in the risk indicator and its categories are the following: 
1. Dummy variable by regions: metropolitan, non-metropolitan
2. Dummy variables by size: no sales (omitted), micro, small, medium
3. Dummy variable by economic sector: sectors 1-8 as described in section 3.3.1 (sector 8 omitted)
4. Final sales share: continuous variables representing sales to final consumers as a proportion of total sales.
5. Dummy variables exporters: exporters, non-exporters (omitted)
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